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LEGAL AID-Lay Control and Organizational Complexity
Render OEO Legal Service Program Unacceptable
to New York Court-In re Community Action
for Legal Services, Inc.*
The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and the New York
City Council Against Poverty approved the organization and the
OEO funding of three legal service corporations as part of a comprehensive program to provide legal assistance to New York City's
poor. According to the plan, the first corporation, Community Action
for Legal Services, Inc. (CALS), was to approve proposed plans for
setting up and operating neighborhood law offices with OEO funds
and then to supervise and coordinate the agencies that sought to
put those plans into operation.1 These agencies, operating as delegates of CALS, and under subcontracts with it, were to hire attorneys
to provide free legal services for indigents. One such delegate, the
New York Legal Assistance Corporation (NYLAC), was to be
created by the city for the purpose of establishing seven neighborhood law offices. Another, the Harlem Assertion of Rights, Inc.
(HAR), was to be organized by a neighborhood group and planned
to establish five law offices in Harlem.2 In conformity with section
280 of the New York Penal Law3 (recently reenacted as section 495
of the New York Judiciary Law) prohibiting the practice of law
by a corporation in the absence of special approval from the proper
appellate division, CALS, NYLAC, and HAR submitted applications to the court for the necessary authorization. The court rejected
the applications without prejudice to the prompt submission of
• 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
I. CALS was also to establish "guidelines" for its delegate agencies, render assistance and advice to them, audit their operations and finances, and develop research
programs for the legal problems of the poor, legal education programs for indigents,
and training programs for the lawyers and lay personnel of the delegate agencies.
2. The presently established New York Legal Aid Society and Mobilization for
Youth, Inc., as well as other groups to be formed, were also to provide legal services as
delegates of CALS.
3. This section was recently re-enacted as § 495 of the New York Judiciary Law
and violation can lead to fines and conviction for misdemeanor. Section 280 of the old
New York Penal Law read in part:
1. No corporation or voluntary association shall
(a) practice or appear as an attorney-at-law for any person in any court in the
state or before any judicial body, nor
(b) make it a business to practice as an attorney-at-law, for any person in any
of said courts, nor
(c) hold itself to the public as being entitled to practice law or to render legal
services or advice.
5. [N]or shall it apply to organizations organized for benevolent or charitable
purposes, or for the purpose of assisting persons without means in the pursuit
of any civil remedy, whose existence, organization or incorporation may be approved by the appellate division of the supreme court of the department in
which the principal office of such corporation or voluntary association may be
located.
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amended proposals, basing its decision primarily upon the fear that
the organizational complexity of the plan and the "lay control" of
the corporations would endanger the professional standards of those
attorneys involved in the program.4
The court's concern with "lay control" stemmed from the plan
to have representatives of the poor serve on the boards of the corporations. 5 Yet since Ia-wyers were to comprise a majority of the membership of the boards of both CALS and NYLAC, 6 it is not clear
exactly what the court meant by "lay control." The opinion can
be interpreted as requiring the complete exclusion of laymen from
the executive staffs and directorates of the corporations.7 But such
a requirement seems to conflict with other decisions regarding laymen and the charitable practice of law through a corporation, 8 and
the appellate division cites nothing to counter this authority.9
Canon 35 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which prohibits
attorneys from submitting to outside lay interference in their client
relationships,10 and state statutes like section 280, which bar corpo4. Principal case at 364, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 791. In addition to these two problems,
which were designated as "major matters," the court raises "other issues." These include: "undefined gnidelines," "political, lobbying, and propagandistic activities,"
"referral or ineligible clients," "indiscriminate mingling of social goals and legitimate
legal practice," "education," "group representation," "use of law students,'' and the
court's own involvement. It is not clear from the opinion whether these "other issues"
are merely gratuitous criticisms or underlying reasons for the rejection of the proposals.
Principal case at 362-65, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 788-91.
5. Principal case at 360, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
6. Twenty-three of the thirty-nvo member CALS board and thirteen of nventy on
NYLAC's board were either required to be lawyers or were to be selected by courts, bar
associations, or the bar controlled Legal Aid Society. HAR was required to have a
minimum of six lawyers on its board of fifteen. Memorandum Submitted by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York at 16-17, 24, principal case.
7. Principal case at 360, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 787: "[T]he executive staff, and those with
responsibility to hire and discharge staff from the very top to the lowest lay echelon
must be lawyers." In re Community Legal Services, Inc., No. 4969 (Pa. C.P. 4, June 30,
1966) (Second Opinion 1967), the court thoroughly criticized the principal case and
apparently assumed that the appellate division had required the exclusion of all
laymen. "[T]his court is unable to agree that professional standards must fail of enforcement simply because some members of a legal assistance corporation, or even a
majority of the members, happen not to be lawyers." Note, Neighborhood Law Offices:
The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARv. L. REv. 805, 838-39 (1967).
8. In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga.
366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940); Azzarello v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 117 Ohio App. 471, 185 N.E.2d
566 (1962); In re Comunity Legal Services, Inc., No. 4968 (Pa. C.P. 4, June 30, 1966).
9. The only case cited by the court is a one paragraph opinion which denied an
application under § 280 to practice law as a corporation. In re Gandhi Soc'y for Human
Rights, 17 App. Div. 2d 622 (1962). The court said the proposed corporation did not
comply with the exception in § 280, and also quoted canon 35 of the Canons of Professional Ethics barring law intermediaries. Since both canon 35 and § 280 make exceptions
for charitable or benevolent legal service groups for the poor, this authority does not
seem compelling unless the court were to find that CALS, NYLAC, and HAR were not
organized to help persons lacking means to pursue legal remedies without charge.
10. Canon 35 Intermediaries.
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by
any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes benveen client and lawyer.
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rate practice of law, were originally aimed at businesses and associations that sought to increase their patronage by providing legal
services for customers or members.11 Underlying these prohibitions
was the fear that when lawyers employed by lay associations work
on projects other than those of general concern to the organization
itself, they lose the independence which is traditionally a part of
the attorney-client relationship. In dealing with the individual problems of client-members or customers the lawyer acts in the role of
an employee dependent on the organization for which he works.
Also, it was believed that involvement in the employer's organization
would jeopardize the confidential relationship of lawyer and client,
and that in serving two masters there would be a temptation to
divide his allegiance when the interest in profits, power, or status
of the lay intermediary paying him conflicted with the interests of
the individual client. Finally, it was thought likely that lay organizations would degrade the legal profession by advertising lawyers'
services and stirring up litigation.12
A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications arc individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such
intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be direct to the client.
Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigents are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association,
club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which the
organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not include
the rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect
to their individual affairs.
II. Examples of corporations illegally providing legal service for profit are (I) banks
engaging in estate planning or drafting of trusts, notes, or mortgages [State Bar Ass'n
v. Connecticut Bank &: Trust Co., 146 Conn. 556, 153 A.2d 453 (1959); People ex rel.
Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931)];
(2) abstract and title insurance companies selling legal opinions on titles or drafting
legal instruments [Klein v. Chicago Title 8: Trust Co., 295 Ill. App. 208, 14 N.E.2d 852
(1938); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Texas 506, 179 S.W.2d 946
(19-14); see Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 184 (1962)]; (3) credit agencies undertaking law suits to
collect the debts due another [Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167
Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937)]. Examples of nonprofit group associations illegally obtaining legal service for its members are (1) motor clubs providing counsel for their
members [People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199
N.E. I (1935)]; (2) landowners or tenants organizing to protect their rights against a
tax [People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187
N.E. 823 (1933)]; (3) unions hiring attorneys for their members [Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. United Mine Workers, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1966), rev'd, 36 U.S.L.W.
4048 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1967); see Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508
(1950); In re Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 162 (1953); Annot., 157 A.L.R. 282 (1945)].
12. This would result in lay groups performing acts which a lawyer is forbidden
to do under canons 27 and 28. Canon 27 provides in part:
Advertising, Direct or Indirect.
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertise•
ments, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted
by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment such
as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged
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In a charitable legal service organization these dangers are minimized or overcome altogether. The absence of pressure to produce
a profit or expand membership precludes the danger of commercial
exploitation. Moreover, the likeliest area of conflict-that of the
pecuniary interests of the organization as opposed to those of the
customer or member-is greatly limited, 13 with corresponding reductions in the dangers of interference with the attorney's independence and the confidential relationship between lawyer and
client. In fact, one of the purposes of legal aid groups is to foster
these very things and thereby upgrade the professional role. For
these reasons, and because of the great public good accomplished by
such groups, courts, ethics committees, and statutes have traditionally
exempted such associations from bans on lay intermediaries and
corporate practice of law. Even the customary prohibitions on advertising, solicitation, and stirring up litigation have been rela.xed
when the purpose of such activities is to represent the rights of the
poor.14
Possibly the appellate division ignored this traditional approach
because of the one obvious conflict of interest which is not precluded by the elimination of the profit motive: the long-range goals
or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, offend the
traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are reprehensible; but the
customary use of simple professional cards is not improper.
Canon 28 provides in part:
Stirring Up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in
rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at
common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of
action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries
or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients.
13. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-43 (1963), Justice Brennan emphasized
the element of private or pecuniary gain at which canons 27, 28, and 35 were aimed.
He further stated that there was no serious danger of "professionally reprehensible
conflicts of interests" with the activities undertaken by the NAACP, reasoning that
"[t]his is so partly because no monetary stakes are involved, and so there is no danger
that the attorney will desert or subvert the paramount interests of his client to enrich
himself or an outside sponsor." 371 U.S. at 443.
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's optimism for the NAACP, it must be admitted
that in the legal aid context a removal of the profit motive will not completely eliminate the occasions for conflicts of interest, although it may greatly reduce them. Not
only may the goals of the organization conflict with the immediate goals and interests
of the client, but the interests of directors--or, in the case of lawyer directors, the
interests of their clients-as well as the interests of representatives of the poor may also
conflict with those of the person being served. The canons conceptually should guard
against conflicts involving the lawyers, but they do not apply to lay directors. This may
explain the appellate division's concern over only the lay directors and not the lawyer
directors. Interview with Prof. James White, University of Michigan Law School, Ann
Arbor, Oct. 20, 1967.
14. American Bar Association, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Nos. 148 (1935), 205 (1940), 227 (1941).
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of the organization may still be opposed to the immediate interests
of the individual client. This potential danger has generally been
the reason advanced for prohibiting the practice of law by nonprofit
organizations which do not serve charitable purposes. 16 Certainly it
must be admitted that the plan under consideration in the principal
case could have resulted in just this type of conflict, and that because
of this conflict lay directors, ignorant of professional standards and
not subject to judicial sanctions for misconduct, might have interfered with an attorney's handling of a particular case. However, if
this is what troubled the court, it could have at least given the OEO
and CALS an opportunity to show that the lawyer-dominated board
had retained sufficient control to insure the maintenance of professional standards.16 Moreover, if the plan submitted did prove unsatisfactory in this respect, alternatives far less drastic than the total
exclusion of laymen were available. For example, the standards of
legal ethics could be incorporated in the charters of the corporations
and the boards given the necessary power to enforce them. If the
court were still dissatisfied, the legislature could enact a statute requiring observance of professional standards by lay directors and
expanding the jurisdiction of the appellate division to enable it to
discipline violators. 17
15. See examples of nonprofit groups prohibited from practicing law in note 11
supra.
16. It seems that if each lawyer were acting professionally he would report and
resist any adverse interference by a lay director or any other party. While canon 35
(quoted in note IO supra) excludes charitable societies rendering legal aid from its
condemnation of law intermediaries, any individual lay director not officially acting for
the whole group would not be within this e.xception, and thus his interference would
not be allowed under canon 35 and should be resisted. Canons 6 and 8 would seem to
require complete disclosure to the client concerning the prospects and merits of his
cause, the advisability of pursuing it, and any possible conflict between the goals and
aims of the group as a whole and his immediate interest:
Canon 6. Adverse Influences and Conflicting interests.
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all
the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of
counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflictin~ interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest
of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
Canon 8 provides in part:
Advising Upon the Merits of a Client's Cause.
A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his client's cause before
advising thereon, and he is bound to give a candid opinion of the merits and
probable result of pending or contemplated litigation .•.. "Whenever the controversy will admit of fair adjustment, the client should be advised to avoid or to
end the litigation.
17. Florida allows attorneys to form legal practice corporations, but any deviation
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As a result of its excessive concern with the evils of lay participation, the court apparently failed to recognize the desirability of
having the poor represented on the governing boards. The court
did encourage the use of the poor on advisory committees,18 and
thus acknowledged the usefulness of seeking advice from those who
best know the needs, aspirations, and limitations of the poor. However, no attention was given to the need for structuring the means
of articulating such advice so as to insure reception and response
by the policymakers. Arguably, this could best be done by representation of the poor on the governing boards. Relegation to a
mere advisory capacity, as proposed by the court, creates the danger
that the voice of the poor would be unsolicited, unheard, and eventually inaudible. In addition, a mere advisory status would probably
hinder participation by the poor as a true and equal partner in working to overcome their problems and replace meaningful involvement
with tokenism, thereby reducing those being aided to the resented
and dependent status of passive donees.
Of course, effective representatives of the poor may be difficult
to find: those who serve may not assert their views or attend meetings. For this and other reasons, it has been contended that participation by the poor on governing boards is unnecessary. 19 Yet, even
assuming that the poor presently lack the ability to participate
effectively, the concept seems at least worthy of a trial period. The
presence of representatives of the poor cannot greatly impair a
board's ability to act, and may in fact provide an opportunity and
encouragement to such representatives to gain experience and become more active in advising and directing. 20 Indeed, Congress
might well have recognized this possibility when it insisted on "maximum feasible participation of residents of the area and members
of the group to be served"21 in all OEO projects. Congress recently
from the canons or any unfaithful or unethical conduct by the corporation or its mem•
hers are still within the control and discipline of the court. See In re Florida Bar, 133
S.2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
18. Principal case at 361, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
19. Prof. White stated that this experience on two legal aid boards and the experience of other boards with which he was familiar cast doubt on the idea that substantial lay representation of the poor was a necessary ingredient of an effective
program. He suggested that the attitudes of the lawyer board members and the attitude
and legal skill of the lawyer employees seemed to be much more important determinants of the program's quality. However, Prof. White stated that it was too early
to conclude that lay representation was unnecessary or unimportant and that such
representation should be continued at least until solid evidence shows that lay representation has no value.
20. See In re Community Legal Services, Inc., No. 4968 (Pa. C.P. 4, June 30, 1966);
Note, supra note 7, at 828-29 (1967); note 19 supra.
21. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2782 (Supp. I, 1965), amending
42 u.s.c. § 2782 (1964).
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interpreted "maximum feasible participation" as meaning a onethird representation of the poor on the boards of community action
programs.22 Although this requirement may bind only the primary
community action board, 23 it can be read to apply to a delegate
legal service board. Clearly, the rationale behind the requirement
seems equally applicable to both.
In light of the "maximum feasible participation" requirement,
the appellate division's apparent exclusion of all laymen from the
delegate boards may have imperiled the OEO financing of the New
York program for legal services. Possibly this threatened loss of
funds, or consideration of the underlying reasons for lay participation, caused the appellate division recently to retreat from the strong
language in its opinion; the court has recently approved a resubmitted proposal that includes one-third lay involvement on the boards.24
Unfortunately, this approval is unlikely to result in a published
opinion,26 and thus nothing will appear in the reporter system that
expressly overrules the position apparently taken in the principal
case. Such a precedent against lay involvement by a most respected
court has already served as a weapon for attacking participation by
the poor on legal service boards.26
The court was also unconvincing in its other major objection,
which was that the structure of the proposed program was so complex, interrelated, and overlapping as to render ineffective any professional or disciplinary supervision.27 Since there are penal and
22. Section 203, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2782 (Supp. Feb. 1967). One-third poor representation
was the interpretation of "maximum feasible participation" on boards even before this
amendment. See, e.g., Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program,
31 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 211, 225 (1966). In § 210, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2785 (Supp. Feb.
1967), Congress further encourages participation of the poor on directorates by providing allowances and expenses for their attending meetings.
23. Each city has a primary community action board which oversees all aspects of
any OEO program in that city. Also, each area of the OEO program, such as the
legal service division or the job training program, has its own board which generally
operates under this primary board. The Congressional requirement may only appiy
to this primary board. Student writers in the Harvard Law Review point out that the
legislative history of this amendment "indicates that this requirement applies only
to the 'umbrella' agency and not to legal services. CONFERENCE REP. No. 2298, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG, & An. NEWS 6052, 6055."
Note, supra note 7, at 829 n.134 (1967).
24. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
25. It is more likely that the appellate division will merely approve the applications
without an opinion.
26. The opinion was presented to block a Philadelphia proposal, but was rejected
and rebutted in an excellent opinion by Judge Alexander in In re Community Legal
Services, Inc., No. 4968 (Pa. C.P., second Opinion, 1967). The New York decision was
also presented in an attempt by the Stanislaus County Bar Association to enjoin the
activities of California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., but this case has not, as of this
writing, been decided. Stanislaus County Bar Ass'n v. California Rural Legal Assistance,
Inc., No. 93302 (Calif. Super. Ct., Jan. 20, 1967).
27. Principal case at 359-60, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87.
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civil sanctions applicable to lawyers on the boards or in neighborhood offices who might act unethically or submit to lay interference, 28 it is doubtful that the court's concern was with the lack of
capacity to administer discipline. More likely, its criticism was
focused on the practical problem of detecting and pinpointing unethical behavior in "such a diffusion of managerial responsibility."29
Yet the court's demand for "directorates of sufficiently small size,
palpable groups amenable to its discipline and sanction," 30 and for
only one legal assistance corporation for each area, 31 seems not to
facilitate policing. Assuming that a given number of attorneys will
be hired with OEO funds regardless of whether there are few or
many organizations, or whether the boards are large or small, it
should not be more difficult to determine the source of an ethical
violation if there are two organizations in the area rather than one,
or if the boards are large rather than small. In fact, it might be
harder for the guilty to camouflage their transgressions from a large
board, since more innocent parties would have to be deceived, or
at least persuaded to countenance the deviant act. Of course, if
limiting the number of associations per area or the size of the
boards reduces the number of la·wyers in the program, and thus the
occasions for violations, easier policing would probably be assured.
However, it is doubtful that this uncertain gain is worth the resulting
loss to the program as a whole. Smaller boards would lack the diversity of talent, specialties, and perspective, as well as the balance
and autonomy that a larger board can provide.32 Moreover, there
may be an advantage in having more than one organization in an
area that is populated by various ethnic groups. 33 Also, it is conceivable that the competition between groups to provide the best service
in the area might not be wasteful, as the court assumes, but rather
might generate efficiency. Thus, the action of the appellate division,
based as it was on mere speculation, seems to have been somewhat
premature.
A lack of empirical data often induces a court to resort to generalities, such as maintaining the sanctity of legal ethics, as the
grounds for its decision. A recent survey by Professor Jerome Carlin
of the New Yark Bar, concerning lawyers' ethics, seems to indicate
that in the principal case that approach resulted in an opinion which
does not reflect social reality. 34 The survey confirms the view that in
28. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 90 (McKinney 1948); N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 270-71, 273
(McKinney 1944).
29. Principal case at 361, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 360, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
32. Pye, supra note 22, at 228.
33. In re Community Legal Services, No. 4968, (Pa. C.P., second opinion, June 30,
1966).
34. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS (1966).
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the lower echelons of the bar, where many ill-trained and financially
insecure attorneys serve, professional violations are commonplace.35
The highly competitive nature of the practice of law at this level
provides an inducement to la·wyers to commit ethical violations in
order to obtain clients.36 La·wyers not only solicit but often yield to
client pressures to represent their causes in unethical ways. 37 Also,
the uninformed client, if he is not a prospect for future business,
is an easy target for exploitation.38 Additionally, the courts and
agencies before which these marginal lawyers practice have informal
procedures and are at times susceptible to a bribe or political favor. 39
Finally, Carlin asserts that the marginal lawyer, unlike his counterpart in the big firm, rarely receives the support and encouragement
of colleagues who are committed to higher standards.40 Indeed, any
colleagueship he may have is likely to reinforce his illicit behavior.
To correct this intolerable situation Professor Carlin recommends the establishment of group legal services.41 Legal aid corpora35. Id. at 11-37, 41-61. In a review of Carlin's book, John A. Young criticizes the
means by which Carlin selected his questions for determining what was ethical. 76
YALE L.J. 1247 (1967). Thus, the questions asked concerned ethical violations that less
secure attorneys were more likely to encounter and transgress and did not relate to
unethical conduct in which secure, large-firm attorneys would be likely to engage-namely, that resulting from conflicts of interest, suppression or destruction of evidence,
use of political influence to name a judge, or even giving advice for the commission of
a fraud. Nevertheless, Erwin 0. Smigel, author of THE WALL STREET LAWYER (1964),
affirms Carlin's findings that the large-law-firm lawyers were more likely to act ethically
since many of their clients would tolerate nothing less. Book Review, 76 YALE L.J.
1253, 1254 (1967).
The results of studies concerning both the quality and quantity of attorneys that
arc available to serve the middle class and the poor are appalling. It has been estimated
that only 10% of the poor needing legal help are presently receiving it. Carlin &
Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.CL.A.L. REv. 381 410 (1965).
In addition to questionable dependability, the inaccessibility and high cost of attorneys,
plus the layman's ignorance of his own legal problems, arc the primary reasons that
these classes get inadequate legal services. Free legal services for the poor as a matter
of right and group legal services for the middle class are being recommended to improve this situation by both Carlin and others. See generally J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON
THEIR OwN (1962); E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED (1963); E. SMIGEL, supra
note 35; Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
381 (1965); Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services; The Responsibility of the Individual Law and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438 (1965); Cheatham, A
Lawyer When Needed; Legal Services for the 11Iiddle Classes, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 973
(1965); Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices and Cures, 5 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRon. 104 (1938); Pye, supra note 22; Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal Services in
Prospective, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 279 (1965); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967). For an author who feels the situation is not as
others have urged, see Simpson, Group Legal Services: The Case for Caution, 12
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 327 (1965).
36. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 66-71 (1966).
37. Id. at 73-76.
38. Id. at 71-73.
39. Id. at 84-94.
40. Id. at 110-15.
41. Id. at 176-82.
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tions such as GALS, NYLAC, and HAR, rather than acting as a
hindrance, can be helpful in upgrading the professional conduct of
many members of the bar. First, the market for legal services is
expanded by bringing in the many poor not being served today,
and this should reduce the competition for clients.42 In addition,
OEO financing would remove the major cause of ethical violations
by providing some measure of economic security, and the better
salaries should also attract some more responsible and skilled attorneys into this type of legal practice.43 Through the intermingling
of a few relatively qualified attorneys in each legal aid office, and
the appointment by the bar of principled practitioners to the directorates, higher standards of performance could be set and the big
firm colleagueship that reinforces professional conduct provided.
Finally, ethically committed attorneys, subject to fewer temptations
and no longer dependent on local politicians or businessmen for
support, could more readily resist and challenge the deviant acts
of other practitioners, lower courts, and agencies, and thereby improve practice and procedure at this level. 44 Thus, instead of presenting a threat to professional standards as the appellate division
suggested, legal aid offers the possibility of improving the profes42. Id. at 180. Not only would many poor persons, who without legal aid could not
afford an attorney, now use one, but there would also be a corresponding increase in
the need for legal services on the other side since matters previously settled by default
would now be contested. Moreover, those attorneys representing the other side may
find that their retainers set for uncontested legal services are now inadequate in light
of the greater amount of work required.
43. Id. at 180-81.
44. Id. at 181. Numerous alternative plans have been suggested in dealing with the
problem of legal services for the poor. The traditional bar-controlled legal aid society,
with its central location and service orientation, has often proved too inaccessible and
narrow in scope for many indigents, and today the neighborhood law office represents
an attempt to bring legal services into geographical proximity to the poor. See generally
Abrahams, Twenty-Five Years of Service: Philadelphia Neighborhood Law Office Plan,
50 A.B.A.J. 728 (1964); Grosser, The Need for a Neighborhood Legal Service and the
New York Experience, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 146 (1965). OEO funds have made great
expansion of these programs possible. The potential of the neighborhood law office
to go beyond the mere service function and seek reforms and social progress was explored by the present Special Assistant to the Director of the OEO, Edgar S. Cahn, and
his wife in The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
Recently, after several hundred neighborhood offices have been operating or funded,
the Cahns have expressed great dismay that these offices are becoming mere service
agencies, and fail to seek reform and attack the roots of poverty. After a brilliant attack
upon our outdated and ineffective "Justice Industry," they suggest further alternatives
such as: the use of non-lawyers to perform many functions now limited to attorneys;
the neighborhood court system; interdisciplinary, crisis-orientated teams; and neighborhood law corporations owned by the people. Cahn &: Cahn, What Price Justice: The
Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NoTRE DA.ME LAw 927 (1966). Lawyer referral and
group legal services are other means of making legal service more readily available to
the middle class, but this fails to help the poor. See generally Christensen, Lawyer Referral Service: An Alternative to Lay-Group Legal Service?, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 341
(1966); Comment, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Associations,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 1331 (1966). For a prediction of the legal changes in our system, see
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 298-305.
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sional performance of la·wyers in an area where it has been embarrassingly poor.
It is rather ironic that the court was even concerned with the
detection of ethical violations, since Professor Carlin indicated that
neither the bar nor the appellate division makes a significant attempt
to police and prosecute such occurrences anyway. 45 Only 25% of all
individual practitioners polled in his survey (many of whom make
up the lower echelon of the bar) were deemed strict conformers to
ethical standards.46 On the other hand, 47% fluctuated in their conformance and 30% were habitual violators.47 Yet of the estimated
4,500 serious violations which occur in New York each year only an
average of 85, or less than 2%, are submitted to any official disciplinary machinery, and of these only 0.02% are sanctioned by disbarment, suspension, or censure.48 Moreover, between 1951 and
1962 the Grievance Committee of the New York City Bar handled
a yearly average of 1,450 complaints against la·wyers, but of these
only 4% ever reached a formal hearing before the Grievance Committee and only 19 per year, on the average, were recommended for
court prosecution. 40 Thus, the survey shows that those entrusted
with maintaining professional standards have all but abdicated their
responsibility except in those instances where a case receives much
notoriety or publicity. 50 These results indicated to Carlin that disciplinary controls and formal sanctions have in the past been aimed
less at scrutinizing moral integrity and ethical conformity, as the
opinion in the principal case would suggest, than at forestalling
public criticism which might endanger the legal profession's monopoly in the market for legal services.51
The appellate division's use of its power under section 280 to
second guess the New York City Council Against Poverty and the
OEO and to attempt to exclude laymen from the governing boards
and to limit the number of directorates and agencies per area is
thus open to criticism. The decision appears especially unreasonable
in light of the availability of other remedies which would have been
less impeding to the total effectiveness of the program while still
45. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 150-62 (1966).
46. Id. at 55.
·!7. Id.
48. Id. at 160.
49. Id. at 151. Canon 29 makes it a lawyer's duty to expose unprofessional conduct.
The last major book on legal ethics also revealed that much justified criticism should
be directed at the reluctant portion of the bar and judges who fail to expose abuses
or to demand reprimand, suspension, or disbarment. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 59
(1953).
50. Id. at 151.
51. Id. at 180. For other criticism of the legal profession's monopoly, see Cahn &:
Cahn, supra note 44, at 927-40; Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A
Struggle Among Power Groups, 4 KAN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1955).
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providing adequate safeguards against the dangers apparently troubling the court. However, a new proposal has been accepted,52 and
thus; although the power exercised by the court has resulted in a
delay in furnishing the poor with needed legal services, a partial
loss of OEO funds, and possibly an atmosphere of apprehension that
could limit the effectiveness of the program, the needed services will
soon be provided. But what of another court that is unsympathetic
to the concept of a legal aid program? It could use similar statutory
power as a weapon against such programs, continually tefusing to
approve applications ort the basis of general references to unspecified
dangers to the legal profession. In view of receht Supreme Court
decisions casting the halo of first amendment guarantees about
certain group activities relating to litigation, it is arguable that this
sort of judicial action might be unconstitutional.
In National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
v. Button,53 the Supreme Court held that the application of a Virginia anti-solicitation statute to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which was seeking out
individuals and representing them in desegregation suits, was an
unconstitutional interference with first and fourteenth amendment
rights of expression and association. The Court emphasized the fact
that the NAACP used law suits riot merely to vindicate individual
claims, but to foster the principle of desegregation and Negro
equality.M The Court viewed this type of litigation as a form of
political expression and association which was a more effective
political tool for the Negro minority under certain circumstances
than attempting to influence the outcome of elections.55 While the
majority of the Court recognized that solicitation was subject to
state regulation, it found no compelling state interest in the contested situation that justified prohibiting the NAACP's actions since
they were not of the malicious, profit-seeking, or oppressive nature
against which solicitation bars were directed. 56 Thus, the decision
made it clear that the first amendment protects litigation that serves
a political purpose from interference by references to vague and unspecified fears about professional misconduct.
More recently, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia
ex rel Virginia State Bar,57 the Court upheld the constitutional right
of a union to refer its members to attorneys of known competence
so that they might pursue Federal Employees Liability Act and
Safety Appliance Act claims. The majority reasoned that a statute
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Id. at 428-31.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 438-43.
377 U.S. I (1964).
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against solicitation could not be invoked to prevent union members
from exercising their constitutional freedoms of "speech, petition
and assembly" 58 to join together in the form of a union and choose
officers who thereafter may advise them or their families on prospective litigation and the selection of an able attorney. The union's
activities, though in no way political, fostered rights concerning
personal injuries which were created by Congress. The majority
again found no compelling state interest that warranted limiting the
first amendment rights involved in the union's activities, since the
referral system of the union did not entail the traditional dangers
of commercialization or "ambulance chasing." 59
In light of the Button and Brotherhood decisions, legal aid
organizations, such as those set up by CALS, NYLAC, or HAR,
might be in a position to argue that their activities also £all within
first amendment protections. 6° Congress has stated that its goal in
all programs set up under the Economic Opportunity Act is not
merely to provide services £or the poor, but to attack the problems
and causes of poverty. 61 As a result, the OEO legal services program
has been justified and interpreted as being organized not simply to
redress separate individual grievances, but also to use legal servic~s
as a means of combating poverty and its causes. 62 In £act, the OEO
Guidelines require each legal service program to adopt the goal of
legal reform. 63 To this end legal aid groups have undertaken test
cases and legislative work, including research, drafting, testifying,
and even lobbying in some instances. 64 In addition, legal service
organizations have engaged in community education by means of
information cards and speeches, the training of legal and nonprofessional personnel, and the gathering of statistics to evaluate the program's effect in countering poverty problems. 65 I£ the NAACP's use
of some of these procedures, including the institution of litigation,
to free Negroes from the restraints of segregation can be considered
58. Id. at 5-6.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Other writers have also indicated that the Button and Brotherhood cases have
opened the way to first amendment protections for legal aid groups and other group
legal services. See Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for the BRT, 12 U.CL.A.L.
REv. 306, 322-25 (1965); Cheatham, Availablity of Legal Services: The Responsibility
of the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438, 453 (1965);
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 305; Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution,
76 YALE L.J. 966 (1967); Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 961, 970 (1966).
61. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964).
62. See, e.g., Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE
L.J. 1317 (1964); Grosser, supra note 44; Pye, supra note 22; Note, supra npte 7.
See also § 215, 80 Stat. 1462 (1966), quoted in part in note 72 infra.
63. OEO, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 23 (1966).
64. Note, supra note 7, at 813-22.
65. Id.
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political activity that aids a racial minority group, it seems that the
activities performed by the neighborhood legal service organizations
could similarly be deemed political since their ultimate goal is to
free an economic minority group from the restraints of landlord
oppression, merchant exploitation, and governmental injustices. 66
Assuming a court would accept this argument, those persons incorporating the legal aid group, or those who direct it, could seemingly claim first amendment protections similar to those of the
NAACP. In Button, it was not the members and nonmembers of
the NAACP receiving legal services whose rights were violated, but
rather the violation was of the rights of those members who sought
to provide these services. 67 And, these persons, like the incorporators
and board of a legal service corporation, were not necessarily of the
same social or economic background as those being served.68
Even if a court ruled that OEO legal aid corporations, because
they are primarily service organizations, are not sufficiently political60
to be analogous to the NAACP in Button, first amendment guarantees may nevertheless be available to these groups. An argument to
this effect can be based upon a factual analogy to Brotherhood, with
its nonpolitical personal injury claims. Such an analogy is, of course,
less direct than the political analogy to Button, since the union in
Brotherhood, unlike a legal service corporation, did not hire attorneys directly. However, in UMW v. Illinois State Bar Association, 10 the Supreme Court has recently authorized the direct hiring
of attorneys by a union to handle workmen's compensation suits for
the union members.71 Whether attorneys could also be hired for
suits less related to the functions of the organization, such as divorce
or criminal suits, as legal aid attorneys would undertake, was
not stated, but in light of the decision it seems likely that these too
would be authorized. This decision also made it clear that the fact
that the rights enforced in Brotherhood were congressionally created
was irrelevant.72 Therefore, first amendment guarantees cover litigation over both state and federal claims.
66. Note, 41 NoTRE DAME I.Aw. 961, 970 (1966). See note 60 supra.
67. 371 U.S. 415, 418, 420 (1963).
68. It could be argued that unlike the Button and Brotherhood situation, most
OEO legal service groups operate under a grant of authority from the state govern•
ment with federal financing and would be in no position to argue that the same state
government is unconstitutionally limiting its authority to provide services.
69. Section 202, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2782 (Supp. Feb. 1967), declares that OEO programs
cannot be used for partisan political activity or for election of any candidate for public
office. The problem is whether the over-all activities are sufficiently political in a nonpartisan sense for first amendment protections.
70. 36 U.S.L.W. 4048 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1967). This opinion was handed down after
this Note had gone to publication and is an expansion of the Brotherhood decision.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 4050 n.5. § 215, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2792 (Supp. Feb. 1967), states in part:
In carrying out sections 204 and 205, the Director shall carry out programs eligible
for assistance under such sections, which provide legal advice and legal representa-
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The most troublesome difficulty with the analogy to Brotherhood
concerns whose first amendment rights are being violated. In that
case the workers receiving the advice and the elected representatives
providing it were all union members73 who voluntarily chose to join
a union so that they could function as a unit. The act of associating
in this form in turn engendered the constitutional right of the
elected "wisest counsel" to advise as to the most effective way of
petitioning the government through the courts.74 Although the poor
of a neighborhod are members of a group defined by a geographical
locus and economic status, rather than by a job and bargaining unit,
the fact remains that they usually have made no attempt to assemble,
confer, or seek advice on petitioning the courts. They, therefore,
have performed no act protected under the Constitution.75 However, it might still be arguable that the incorporators and those who
will participate on the boards of legal aid groups, a portion of whom
will be representatives or "wisest counsel" of the poor, are performing constitutionally protected acts. They do assemble to advise and
petition the government through the courts; and they are the representatives of a group which has proved ineffective in asserting its
own rights. 76
If a court also rejects the factual analogy to Brotherhood, there
might be yet another approach to the first amendment question. It
tion to persons when they are unable to afford the services of a private attorney,
together with legal research and information as appropriate to mobilize the
assistance of lawyers and legal institutions, or combinations thereof, to further the
cause of justice among persons living in poverty.
73. 377 U.S. I, 4-6 (1964). The advice was given to the union member if alive,
or his widow and children. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 5-7.
75. The court in Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. UMW, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503,
508, 510 (Ill. 1966), rev'd, 36 U.S.L.W. 4048 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1967), indicates in dicta that
there might be a constitutional violation if indigents' rights were being represented.
Judge Alexander in his second opinion in In re Community Legal Services, Inc., No.
•1968 (Pa. C.P. 4, June 30, 1966), (Second Opinion, 1967), at 123, also suggests that the
poor may have constitutional rights to petition the courts, and that these are at stake:
While the present case concerns the incorporation of Community Legal Services to
provide services to those who live in the area of "poverty" and to low income
citizens, the right of those citizens to petition the courts and otherwise to speak
and associate thus to secure redress of grievances are, of course, at stake here.
The incorporators of Community Legal Services may properly raise the constitutional rights of these citizens: Griswold v. Connecticut, !HS U.S. 479, 481 (1965);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Zimroth argues that in Button not only the legal service program of the NAACP was
protected, but that the opinion can be read as either giving any person the right to
be a plaintiff in a suit or recognizing a constitutionally protected right to litigate.
Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966 (1967).
76. When litigation itself is not a form of political expression as it was in Button,
the question remains as to whether the lawyers have a constitutional right to petition
government for redress of the separate grievances of others. Some authorities believe that
the poor may have a special right to litigation. See authorities cited in note 75 supra.
Although there are no cases upholding such a right, the same deference given to the
poor might aUow attorneys to claim first amendment protections when representing
this group.
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seems that Button and Brotherhood together have created a novel
and presently undelineated area of first amendment protections concerning litigation, and that the penumbra of this protection may
extend to include charitcl-ble legal service organizations.77 That is,
regardless of factual similarities to the legal aid context, the two
cases may indicate a trend which will culminate in the recognition
of legal service corporations as another group that exercises first
amendment rights when it assembles to assert either political or nonpolitical claims for others who are unq.ple meaningfully to assert
their own rights.78
Assuming, arguendo, that the activities of neighborhood law
offices are protected by the first amendment, the next question is
whether the application of a New York type statute would be an
unconstitutional interference with these activities. This question
seemingly should be answered in the affinnative, at least in the context of the principal case. There is a clear parallel between the
appellate divisio11's denial of the petitions because of vaguely defined potential dangers to professional standards which might result
from the organizatio11al structure of the legal services program and
the Virginia court's prohibiting the activities of the NAACP and
the union on the l:,asis of similar fears as to the effect of solicitation
on professional standards. Moreover, in the principal case, as in the
nvo Virginia cases, the traditional threats to professional standards
caused by profit seeking were absent and there was no mention of
any other compelling interest which would justify interference with
rights protected by the first amendment.
There are two additional problems with the constitutional argument. The first stems from the fact that the appellate division's refusal to approve the plan would not prohibit poor individuals from
l)ringing their own suits nor would it prevent lawyers from joining
together in partnership form to give free services to the poor. Therefore, such court action would not theoretically prevent the adjudication of the rights of the poor or association to encourage the
assertion of those rights. In Button and Brotherhood, however, although the Virginia antisolicitation statute similarly did not
expressly prohibit individuals from bringing desegregation or personal injury suits, it was nevertheless held unconstitutional as
applied. The Court recognized the impact of the effective practical
restraints created by a dearth of lawyers willing to represent Negroes
in Button79 and the experiences of union members with incompetent or dishonest attorneys in Brotherhood.80 A similar practical
77.
78.
79.
80.

See
See
fl7l
377

notes 60 8e 75 supra.
notes 60, 75 8e 76 supra.
U.S. 415, 435-36 (1963).
U.S. I, 3-4 {1964).

December 1967]

Recent Developments

405

restraint would seemingly result from prohibiting groups seeking to
provide free legal services from using the corporate form or that of
a voluntary association, so that such a prohibition could also be
declared unconstitutional, assuming first amendment protections are
applicable.81
This analysis, however, reveals the second problem: statutory
provisions such as section 280 do not prohibit all free legal service
associations, whereas the Virginia statute barred all solicitation.
Section 280 merely prohibits corporate practice of law for the poor
which is carried on without obtaining a court authorization to do
so. Yet this, in effect, amounts to the imposition of a licensing requirement, and it has been established that whenever licensing is
a prerequisite to the exercise of first amendment rights there must
be explicitly defined standards if condemnation as an unconstitutional prior restraint is to be avoided.82 A case in point is Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 83 where the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
as a prior restraint on the freedom of religion a statute requiring
any person soliciting money for a religious cause to procure first a
certificate from an official who had the power to determine whether
the cause was actually religious. There was an admitted state interest
in the prevention of fraud, but the statute was nevertheless held
unconstitutional as applied because of the lack of specific standards
and the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory application.84 The
appellate division's discretion under section 280 to determine what
is professionally acceptable is no more limited by specific guidelines
than that of the official in Cantwell and is equally susceptible to
arbitrary application. Moreover, the fact that a court is exercising
81. Even if the group could use the unique form of a nonprofit law partnership,
such an organization presents a number of problems. First, it would probably be
difficult to find qualified program directors. Few lawyers would be willing to join a
partnership with persons they might not even know, face unlimited personal liability,
and yet receive no compensation for their services. While it is true that malpractice
insurance could reduce the risk of liability by affording protection against suits for
misrepresentation, it would not provide a shield against actions for debt or for other
torts. Second, a law partnership would face grave ethical problems if it sought to
include laymen as the OEO seems to require. Canon 33 provides in part:
In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person should be
admitted or held out as a practitioner or member who is not a member of the
li:gal profession duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional discipline.
Third, a law partnership might lose the favorable tax treatment of a charitable
corporation, although it is possible that such tax advantages might nevertheless be
obtained through the use of charitable trusts. Finally, a partnership, lacking the perpetual existence and ease of executive-management control of a corporation, would
seem a cumbersome means of managing the kind of vast legal service contemplated
by the New York program.
_
82. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
83. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
84. Id. at 303-07.
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this discretion rather than an administrative official would not free
it from the condemnation of being a prior restraint. 85
Although not exhaustive, the above discussion at least suggests
that in light of the facts and possible implications of the Button and
Brotherhood decisions legal service programs under the OEO may
be within the scope of the first amendment, and that statutory provisions like section 280, because they lack clearly defined standards,
may be unconstitutional prior restraints. On the other hand, statutes
of this type, if narrowly drawn, are a proper exercise of the state's
police power, since maintaining and fostering standards of competence and professional ethics in the practice of law are legitimate
state concerns. Thus, if states wish to retain such restrictions, 86 clear
and specific criteria enunciating what is necessary to obtain a license
should be established. 87 This would be wise not only to avoid any
possible first amendment problems, but also because it would necessitate a thorough investigation of today's social realities and of what
is needed to preserve professional competence and integrity in legal
aid work as well as in other types of practices. It is to be hoped that
the criteria enacted would eliminate the opportunities for discretional abuse and exclude only those groups actually posing a
threat to ethical standards. While this will be a difficult task, it is
better to undertake it through legislative reform after a complete
and searching analysis, than by means of constitutional litigation
which seldom leaves a court the time or the resources for deep study
and unhurried reflection.
85. "A statute authorizing previous restraint upon that exercise of the guaranteed
freedom by judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint by administrative action." Id. at 306. See also Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
86. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 415 (1954); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 30-2-5 (1966)
(allowing charitable corporations to practice law for indigents without a special court
approval); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-27-18 (1956); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 2.50.010-.150
(1959) (making special provision allowing legal aid to operate).
87. In setting these standards, the need for close association with other professional
and nonprofessional services, realistic and flexible standards of indigency, the use of
law students and laymen in investigating and interviewing, the extent of social and
political involvement, the representation of groups and unpopular causes, and the
position of research, drafting, and lobbying for legislative reforms are all aspects that
should be considered and given ample opportunity for growth and development.
Finally, several of the canons, such as those concerning advertising, fomenting litigation, and lay intermediaries will require a critical evaluation in order to determine
whether they protect professional standards in legal services for indigents or instead
act as impediments to the legal profession's provision of legal services for the poor.
J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 180-81 (1966); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 161-67 (1953);
Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Class, 63 CoLUM.
L. REv. 973, 979 (1965); McCracken, Report on Observances of the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 VA. L. REv. 399 (1951); Powell, The Response of the Bar, 51
A.B.A.J. 751, 781 (1965). A Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards was
authorized by the House of Delegates in 1964, 50 A.B.A.J. 970 (1965).

